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Footnotes
1. DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LEGAL ALCHEMY: THE USE AND MISUSE OF SCIENCE
IN THE LAW 69 (1999).
2. One exception to this yawning silence is the work of Joseph
Sanders. See generally Joseph Sanders, Applying Daubert Inconsis-
tently? Proof of Individual Causation in Toxic Tort and Forensic Cases,
75 BROOK. L. REV. 1367 (2010). In addition, the statistical challenges
associated with individualizing group data have been examined
with considerable sophistication in the context of predictions of
violence. See, e.g., Stephen D. Hart et al., Precision of Actuarial Risk
Assessment Instruments: Evaluating the ‘Margins of Error’ of Group v.
Individual Predictions of Violence, 190 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY s60 (2007);
Douglas Mossman, Analyzing the Performance of Risk Assessment
Instruments: A Response to Vrieze and Grove, 32 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
279, 280 (2008); Scott I. Vrieze & William M. Grove, Predicting Sex
Offender Recidivism, 32 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 266, 267 (2008). The
problems of individualizing group data have also caught the atten-
tion of neuroscientists. See, e.g., Michael B. Miller et al., Extensive
Individual Differences in Brain Activations Associated with Episodic
Retrieval Are Reliable over Time, 14 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 1200
(2002). On the issue more generally, see John A. Swets, Robyn M.
Dawes & John Monahan, Better Decisions Through Science, 283 SCI.
AM. 82 (2000). Ultimately, however, the question of individualizing
group data for courtroom use is not simply a problem of inferential
statistics. See David L. Faigman, The Limits of Science in the Court-
room, in BEYOND COMMON SENSE: PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE IN THE
COURTROOM 303 (Eugene Borgida & Susan T. Fiske eds., 2008).
3. See, e.g., Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating General Causation: Notes
Towards a New Theory of Justice and Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV.
2117, 2129–30 (1997); Margaret A. Berger & Lawrence M. Solan,
The Uneasy Relationship Between Science and Law: An Essay and
Introduction, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 847, 852–53 (2008).
4. Daniel B. Mark, Decision-Making in Clinical Medicine, in 1 HARRI-
SON’S PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 6, 6 (Dennis L. Kaspar et
al. eds., 16th ed. 2005).
5. See, e.g., DAVID J. STENSRUD, PARAMETERIZATION SCHEMES: KEYS TO
UNDERSTANDING NUMERICAL WEATHER PREDICTION MODELS (2007).
6. For example, Dr. Jerome Groopman cautions against over-reliance
on evidence-based medicine, fearing that it “risks having the
physician choose [a treatment course] passively, solely by the
numbers,” rather than rely on the individual circumstances of
each patient. JEROME GROOPMAN, HOW DOCTORS THINK 5–6 (2007).
7. See DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., 3 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE
LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 21:6-7, at 27–45
(2008–2009 ed.) (listing cases). Not all science is engaged in
describing cause-and-effect relationships, so “general causation”
and “specific causation” are subcategories of what might more
properly be labeled “general propositions” and “specific applica-
tion.” Sometimes general propositions in science will be stated in
causative terms, but very often they will be associational, techni-
cal, or descriptive. Specific application refers to the determination
whether a particular case is an instance, use, or example of gen-
eral propositions that are supported by research.
Scientists typically study variables at the population level,and most of their methodological and statistical tools aredesigned for this kind of work. The trial process, in con-
trast, ordinarily concerns whether a particular case is an
instance of the general phenomenon. As I have previously
observed, “[w]hile science attempts to discover the universals
hiding among the particulars, trial courts attempt to discover
the particulars hiding among the universals.”1 This essential
difference in perspective between what scientists normally do
and what the trial process is ordinarily about has yet to be
studied with any degree of rigor—by scientists or lawyers.2 Yet
this phenomenon is endemic to virtually every context in
which law and science meet. Indeed, it might be said to be the
single greatest obstacle to the law’s rational use of science.3
The challenges associated with individualizing science,
however, are not unique to the law. In fact, in a wide variety of
social contexts, empirical research exploring general phenom-
ena are sought to be applied reliably to individual cases. In
medicine, for example, research on the effectiveness of various
cancer therapies will inform a particular patient’s decision
regarding which therapy to choose. In meteorology, research
on hurricanes will inform a governor’s decision regarding
whether to evacuate a particular city. Indeed, all applied sci-
ence, ranging from aerodynamics to zoology, potentially pre-
sents the problem of making decisions about discrete cases
based on group data. Different fields have adapted strategies to
respond to the evidentiary-incommensurability challenge with
differing degrees of success. In medical decision-making, for
example, evidence-based medicine is one way that doctors
have sought to bring data to bear on individual diagnostic and
therapeutic judgments.4 Meteorologists generate computer
models that describe the likelihoods associated with a storm’s
path and strength.5 At least from an outsider’s perspective,
these efforts have not been so successful that courts would
want to borrow them wholesale.6
How and whether general data can be usefully employed to
inform decisions about individual events is a problem that is
central to the law’s function. In fact, courts are generally
acquainted with the difficulties inherent in employing general
scientific data to reach conclusions about specific cases. The
primary area in which courts have considered this matter is in
medical causation cases where they distinguish routinely
between “general causation” and “specific causation.”7 Courts
and legal scholars have not, however, engaged in a careful
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study of the details and intricacies associated with this matter
across the wide spectrum of cases in which it presents itself. In
addition, although the courts are passingly familiar with the
problem of evidentiary incommensurability, they naturally
approach the subject from their own need for information,
with little appreciation for how and whether scientists can pro-
duce this information. Courts frequently demand empirical
answers despite scientists’ inability to provide them.8 At the
same time, scientists involved in the legal process naturally
approach the problem of incommensurability from the per-
spective of their own desire to produce information, with little
appreciation for how and whether the courts can effectively
use this information.9 It is hardly surprising that scientists
should study the questions that they are most curious about
and able to answer rather than those the law deems most rele-
vant. In short, therefore, the two sides, law and science, per-
ceive incommensurability from their separate vantage points,
which largely perpetuates the problem.
This essay jumps into the center of this conundrum. My
objective, however, is somewhat unusual. It is a call to arms.
I do not aim to resolve the incommensurability paradox but
rather to ring the fire bell. Indeed, given the scope and depth
of the obstacles presented by evidentiary incommensurability,
it is a subject well beyond resolution in the pages provided to
me here. My purpose, then, is to explore the paradox in the
hope that it will help lay a common framework through
which both lawyers and scientists might understand the chal-
lenges presented at the intersection of these two great profes-
sions. This essay, therefore, contemplates many of the sundry
issues that would have to be reckoned with in any subsequent
comprehensive effort to bring systematic rationality to the
problem of employing group data to decide individual cases.
It is divided into two parts. Part I, Hypothesis Testing in Sci-
ence, considers scientific hypothesis testing and the inherent
population focus of most of that work. While most scientific
research focuses on a general population-level analysis,
results of that work can have very different levels of probative
value in regard to informing decision-making at the individ-
ual level. Part II, Framing Empirical Questions in the Court-
room, examines evidentiary demands in the courtroom and
the inherent individualized focus of that process. This part
also considers some of the challenges inherent in any attempt
to close the evidentiary-incommensurability gap between
what most science says and what most legal proceedings need
to know.
HYPOTHESIS TESTING IN SCIENCE
Scientific research is most often conducted from a general
and population-based perspective. This is a defining charac-
teristic of the field. However, sci-
entific methods, and the phenom-
ena that scientists study, range
widely. Inevitably, the demands of
the empirical context dictate
which set of research designs are,
or might be, available. While
studying the effects of depleted
biodiversity in the Amazon rain-
forest and investigating the inter-
action between neuron and glial
cells in a rat’s brain are both scientific endeavors, the methods
involved are obviously disparate. Yet, from the law’s perspec-
tive, there may be certain insights that persist across scientific
domains in regard to individualizing group data. This section
provides a preliminary sketch of the scientific landscape and
examines whether certain common denominators might be
identified within the process of bringing group data to bear
on individual decisions.
The essential question posed in the context of reasoning
from the group to the individual is whether a particular case is
an instance of the general phenomenon. If smoking causes
lung cancer, the individualized query is whether a particular
person’s lung cancer was caused by smoking. The degree to
which scientific research might be relevant to resolving an
individualized question varies from completely to not-at-all
relevant. In some areas, science might provide a definitive
answer to the question of whether an individual case is an
instance of a general phenomenon. If tobacco smoke is the
only cause of lung cancer, we logically know that someone
with lung cancer got sick from tobacco smoke. In other areas,
science might help increase the accuracy of individual deci-
sion-making along a range of helpfulness, from nearly deter-
minative to just above random chance. If tobacco smoke
causes lung cancer, but many other things, known and
unknown, do so as well, we cannot say with certainty that the
person’s lung cancer was caused by tobacco smoke. The degree
of certainty that the science provides, of course, is the opera-
tive question. Indeed, sometimes even very good science will
not demonstrably improve the accuracy of individual decision-
making, though it might nonetheless be relevant and admissi-
ble in court because it provides the triers of fact with contex-
tual information that will help them understand other evi-
dence in the case.
WHEN GENERAL SCIENCE IS DETERMINATIVE IN 
PARTICULAR CASES
In practice, the law is interested not simply in whether a
particular variable causes a particular effect, but, ultimately, in
8. Among many possible examples that could be cited, possibly the
most obvious is that of predicting violence. Courts call upon
experts in myriad contexts to predict future behavior, from proba-
tion decisions to capital sentencing, though the best empirical
research indicates that such expert opinions remain highly falli-
ble. See John Monahan, A Jurisprudence of Risk Assessment: Fore-
casting Harm Among Prisoners, Predators, and Patients, 92 VA. L.
REV. 391, 405–07 (2006).
9. Scientists do not generally study how to “individualize” their find-
ings in ways that would make their findings more helpful for legal
usage. This is not meant as a criticism, only an observation. Espe-
cially in the social sciences, it is ordinarily sufficient to find a sta-
tistically significant effect among college sophomores. Little atten-
tion has been paid to how the variables studied might operate in
a particular case.
“The essential
question . . . 
is whether a
particular case
is an instance
of the general
phenomenon.”
whether a particular variable did
cause the effect.10 Scientific
research will sometimes identify
a single unidirectional relation-
ship between two variables. In
medicine, the term pathogno-
monic refers to a diagnostic ver-
sion of this insight. A symptom
is pathognomonic when it is
“decisively characteristic of a dis-
ease.”11 For example, “Koplik’s
spots are pathognomonic of
measles.”12 The strongest version
of a path-specific relationship would be the unusual situation
where a cause and an effect are uniquely associated, such that
the cause always produces the effect and the effect is always
attributable to the cause. Outside of basic physics and chem-
istry, however, the strongest version of path-specificity will be
quite rare. Nonetheless, such relationships are possible. This
strong version could be termed cause/effect path-specificity
because the cause and the effect are uniquely tied to one
another.
The law is also interested in weaker versions of path-speci-
ficity. For instance, a particular cause might always produce a
particular effect, but other causes might produce similar
effects. This could be termed causal path-specificity because
the cause always produces a single effect, but other causes
might produce the same effect. An example of this might be a
lesion in a specific part of the brain that produces auditory hal-
lucinations. Anyone with such a lesion would suffer from audi-
tory hallucinations, but not all people with auditory hallucina-
tions have a lesion in that region of the brain. Conversely, a
particular effect might always be produced by a particular
cause, but the cause does not invariably produce the effect.
This could be termed effect path-specificity because the effect
has a single cause, but the cause does not have a single effect.
An example of this is the relationship between asbestos expo-
sure and mesothelioma. The unique cause of mesothelioma is
exposure to asbestos, but not everyone exposed to asbestos
develops mesothelioma.13
In legal proceedings, the strength and nature of path-speci-
ficity is likely to be important. In general, cause/effect path-
specificity will be the most probative kind of scientific evi-
dence available. In contrast, the probative power of causal
path-specificity or effect path-specificity will depend on the
substantive law of the case. For example, in many criminal
cases, the issue will be whether the defendant suffered the rel-
evant effect, and it will not matter greatly that a variety of
causes can produce it. In such cases, scientific evidence of
causal path-specificity would strongly support the defendant’s
case. This would be so in an insanity case in which evidence
that the defendant has a brain lesion that invariably produces
auditory hallucinations would be highly probative, despite the
fact that other factors might cause the same symptoms. Con-
versely, in many civil cases, effect path-specificity will be the
more probative kind of evidence. In the example of mesothe-
lioma, a civil plaintiff who has this disease will be able to trace
it back to asbestos exposure. In many civil cases, a substantial
obstacle to a plaintiff ’s recovery is showing that the effect he
or she suffers from is attributable to a cause associated with
the defendant. Effect path-specificity solves this difficulty. If
the defendant was responsible for the plaintiff ’s asbestos expo-
sure, then the plaintiff ’s mesothelioma is attributable to the
defendant.
WHEN GENERAL SCIENCE IS PROBATIVE, BUT NOT
DETERMINATIVE, IN PARTICULAR CASES
In most applied-science contexts, path-specificity is not
possible, either because it does not exist in actuality or because
scientists’ methods are unable to identify it in those cases in
which it does exist. In most areas of interest to the law, scien-
tific research provides knowledge about cause-and-effect rela-
tionships generally, but will be only more or less determinate
on the question of whether a specific instance of an effect is
attributable to a specific cause, or that a specific cause con-
tributed to a particular effect. In this vast domain, applied sci-
entific research comes in myriad forms, and its value for decid-
ing individual cases varies greatly. In some situations, the sci-
ence will be nearly definitive regarding a specific cause-and-
effect relation, and in others it will do little more than increase
the likelihood slightly above chance that a relevant relation-
ship exists.
As is true with the concept of path-specificity discussed in
the previous section, indeterminate scientific research might
be relevant in legal proceedings in three separately identifiable
ways, regarding (1) effect only, because the cause is known (or
can be assumed); (2) cause only, because the effect is known
(or can be assumed); or (3) both cause and effect. As will
become clear in the discussion that follows, the intended pur-
pose for which the science is to be used is associated with the
demands that courts place on the science itself.
In many legal contexts, only the effect is relevant because
the causal variable is fairly known or is assumed. Indeed, one
of the best-known subjects in law and psychology fits this cat-
egory: eyewitness identification. In eyewitness-identification
research, researchers have found that certain factors interfere
with accuracy, such as presence of a weapon, cross-race identi-
fications, and use of leading questions by interviewers.14 In
“In some 
situations, the
science will be
nearly definitive
regarding a 
specific cause-
and-effect
relation. . . .”
10. This analysis simplifies matters considerably, since both the exis-
tence and extent of the cause, as well as the existence and extent
of the effect, may be disputed in a particular case.
11. MONDOFACTO ONLINE MEDICAL DICTIONARY, PATHOGNOMONIC, http://
www.mondofacto.com/facts/dictionary?pathognomonic (last vis-
ited Nov. 5, 2013).
12. MEDICINENET, DEFINITION OF PATHOGNOMONIC, http://www.med
terms.com/script/main/art.asp?articlekey=6386 (last visited Nov.
5, 2013).
13. Asbestos also causes other ailments, including lung cancer. See
Piero Mustacchi, Lung Cancer Latency and Asbestos Liability, 17 J.
LEGAL MED. 277, 280 (1996). But, as mentioned, some people who
are exposed to asbestos never get sick from it.
14. See Gary L. Wells, Eyewitness Identification: Scientific Status, in 2
MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TES-
TIMONY, supra note 7, at 520, 534–47. 
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15. See Michael Nash & Robert Nadon, Hypnosis: Scientific Status, in
2 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT
TESTIMONY, supra note 7, at 733.
16. David A. Bright & Jane Goodman-Delahunty, Gruesome Evidence
and Emotion: Anger, Blame, and Jury Decision-Making, 30 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 183 (2006).
17. Kevin D. Browne & Catherine Hamilton-Giachritsis, The Influence
of Violent Media on Children and Adolescents: A Public-Health
Approach, 365 LANCET 702, 702 (2005).
18. See generally FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 27–49.
19. See Helena Kraemer et al., Coming to Terms With the Terms of Risk,
54 ARCHIVE GEN. PSYCHIATRY 337, 340 (1997). It should be noted
that, very often, an expert witness’s predictions of violence are not
based on scientific research at all. Many, if not most, opinions
offered in court on this subject are based on clinical judgment,
and they are presented accordingly as conclusions about a partic-
ular person. On the value of clinical versus actuarial predictions
of violence, see Stefania Aegisdottir, The Meta-Analysis of Clinical
Judgment Project: Fifty-Six Years of Accumulated Research on Clini-
cal Versus Actuarial Predictions of Violence, 34 COUNSELING PSY-
CHOLOGIST 400 (2006).
this example, the causal side of the equation is the indepen-
dent variable, which is more or less known or assumed to be
present in the case. The focus, therefore, is principally on what
effect this causal variable has had. Hence, if the witness is
white and the perpetrator is black, the empirical crux of the
matter concerns what effect this causal variable has on the
accuracy of the identification. Other examples in which the
effects are relevant and the cause is known or assumed include
the effects of hypnosis on memory,15 the impact of putatively
prejudicial photographs or images on fact-finders’ judg-
ments,16 and the effect of violent television on viewers.17
In effect-relevant cases—that is, where the cause is known
or assumed and the effects have been the subject of research—
the science is rarely employed to do more than provide gen-
eral insights about those who have experienced the causal
variable of interest. It may very well be, for instance, that
when a gun is present, eyewitness identifications are on aver-
age less accurate than when one is not; but this finding pro-
vides very little information regarding whether any particular
identification is accurate. In the law, general research findings
might very well be relevant and admissible to inform the jury
of factors that might interfere with a witness’s accurate recall,
which the jury could use or ignore as it deemed fit. The sci-
ence in this case, however, says very little about eyewitness
identification.
The second category, and one that arises often in court, is
when the effect is fairly known (or can be assumed), and the
science is offered to demonstrate the cause of that effect.
Whole areas of medical and psychological causation fit this
category, as do some areas of forensic science. In medical cau-
sation, a plaintiff might be known to have leukemia (i.e., the
effect) and the scientifically controverted issue will be whether
one variable (e.g., trichloroethylene) or another caused the ill-
ness. In psychological causation, the same analysis applies. For
example, a witness who suffers from post-traumatic stress dis-
order (PTSD) might claim that it was caused by a sexual
assault rather than other causes, such as a failed marriage and
a lost job. Finally, some areas of forensic science fit this cause-
relevant category. The best example is arson investigation. In
the ordinary arson case, the effect is known (i.e., a burned or
exploded structure), but the science is offered to demonstrate
the cause (e.g., purposely set using some incendiary device or
material).
When the proffered science is relevant to determining the
cause of some known effect, it is ultimately meant to operate
diagnostically in regard to the individual case at hand. This
category presents the most classic manifestation of the chal-
lenges associated with applying rea-
soning from group data to decisions
in individual cases. In many areas,
the research provides substantial
evidence of a general connection
between variables, but the science
does not pave a direct path for
extrapolating general data to apply
to the individual case. Ordinarily,
some additional method is used to
bring the general science to the individual case, usually labeled
vaguely as “differential diagnosis” or “differential etiology.”18
This issue is considered in Part II, infra.
The third and final category of scientific relevance is some-
thing of a catch-all and involves those cases in which the sci-
ence informs both the cause and the effect sides of the equa-
tion. In other words, in this category the situation or context
is argued to have legal significance, but the science is necessary
to show how or why this is so. Many psychological claims fall
into this category, as do most forensic identification technolo-
gies. A good example of the former is research on predictions
of violence. The matter of predicting violence has wide signif-
icance in the law, and scientists have sought to provide guid-
ance on this issue by relating one set of variables (i.e., predic-
tors) to another variable (i.e., future violence). Neither the
“cause” nor the “effect” is known outside of the applicable
research. Most forensic-identification technologies operate
similarly. Scientific research on DNA profiling, for instance,
describes both the existence of the phenomenon as well as the
significance of that phenomenon for legal decision-making.
Significantly, both actuarial predictions of violence and DNA
profiling are framed generally, and, to the extent that they are
applied to individual cases, the proffered opinions ordinarily
remain in their general population-based form.19
In the end, law and science are separate disciplines and,
though they often share goals or objectives, neither is nor
should be expected to be the other’s handmaiden. It is hardly
surprising, therefore, that the methods of science do not cor-
respond neatly to the needs of the law. Yet, at least in a prelim-
inary way, it is possible to identify general pathways of scien-
tific investigation and consider how they sometimes might, but
oftentimes do not, provide the answers to the questions the
law poses. Understanding the parameters of the scientific
enterprise, however, is only the first step in improving the
law’s use of research data. Much of the information the law
needs from science does not fit neatly into conventional modes
of empirical inquiry. Whereas scientists ordinarily study causes
“[T]he methods
of science do
not correspond
neatly to 
the needs of
the law.”
Court Review - Volume 50 55
20. I too have participated in this endeavor, though my efforts were
restricted to constitutional cases. See DAVID L. FAIGMAN, CONSTITU-
TIONAL FICTIONS: A UNIFIED THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL FACTS
43–62 (2008).
21. Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the
Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 402–03 (1942).
22. Id. at 402; see also FED. R. EVID. 201(a), Advisory Committee’s
Note (“Legislative facts are those which have relevance to legal
reasoning and the lawmaking process, whether in the formulation
of a legal principle or ruling by a judge or court or in the enact-
ment of a legislative body.”).
23. Davis, supra note 21, at 402.
24. John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining,
Evaluating and Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L.
REV. 477 (1986) [hereinafter Monahan & Walker (1986)]; Lau-
rens Walker & John Monahan, Social Facts: Scientific Methodology
as Legal Precedent, 76 CAL. L. REV. 877 (1988) [hereinafter Walker
& Monahan (1988)]; Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social
Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559
(1987) [hereinafter Walker & Monahan (1987)].
25. Walker & Monahan (1987), supra note 24, at 562.
26. Monahan & Walker (1986), supra note 24, at 490–91.
27. Walker & Monahan (1988), supra note 24, at 887.
28. Walker & Monahan (1987), supra note 24, at 563–67. According
to Monahan and Walker’s social-framework model, the judge
would consider and instruct the jury on the accuracy of the gen-
eral claim, but the jury would also hear expert testimony on how
the research applies to the case before it. Id. at 592. In traditional
practice, however, the jury is the fact-finder for both components
of social-framework evidence. For present purposes, I need not
choose which procedural approach is the better one.
29. 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005).
and effects in populations, courts
ordinarily need to determine
causes and effects in particular
individuals. The next section
examines the difficulties endemic
to developing a rigorous individ-
ual-based empiricism.
FRAMING EMPIRICAL QUES-
TIONS IN THE COURTROOM
The basic perspective of most
courtroom proceedings is individ-
ual and specific. Courts look to
answer such questions as whether the defendant killed the vic-
tim, the plaintiff’s leukemia was caused by a chemical pro-
duced by the defendant, the juvenile defendant is competent to
be tried as an adult, the capital defendant is likely to be violent
if not executed, and so forth. While the ultimate issue in most
legal proceedings involves the determination of a particular
fact (or facts), courts well understand that underlying these
specific questions is knowledge about the general world.
Hence, a defendant’s guilt might depend on the general match
probabilities of DNA evidence, and a plaintiff’s civil claim
against a chemical manufacturer might depend partly on epi-
demiological studies showing an association between the
alleged offending chemical and leukemia. Tackling the com-
plex challenge of integrating scientific research into legal deci-
sion-making would be helped considerably if there were a
vocabulary that permitted categorization of the different ways
science might be relevant to legal decision-making. There has
been no shortage of attempts at providing such a taxonomy.20
TAXONOMIES OF FACT-FINDING
The first, and still most influential, taxonomy of fact-find-
ing in law was offered by Professor Kenneth Culp Davis.21
Davis distinguished between what he termed legislative facts
and adjudicative facts. Legislative facts are those facts that
transcend the particular dispute and are relevant to legal rea-
soning and the fashioning of legal rules.22 Adjudicative facts, in
contrast, are those facts particular to the dispute.23
In a series of influential articles in the 1980s, Professors
John Monahan and Laurens Walker refined Davis’s dichotomy
in a manner that more fully captures the ways that science is
used in the courtroom.24 Their primary focus was on the law’s
use of social science. They identified three levels of conver-
gence between social science and law: social authority, social
facts, and social frameworks. Social authority refers to social
science research relevant to the determination of legislative
facts and thus the formulation of legal rules.25 According to
their proposal, social authority is analogous to legal authority
and should be consulted similarly. Hence, judges would con-
sider social science “precedent” (i.e., past research) as pre-
sented through briefs, arguments, and sua sponte.26 The infor-
mation found to be relevant and valid would then be incorpo-
rated into the judge’s conclusions of law. Alternatively, in the
Monahan-Walker model, social science research might be rele-
vant to adjudicative facts (what they call “social facts”), in
which case, after being deemed admissible, it would be pre-
sented to the trier of fact through expert testimony.27 Finally,
social science research might have relevance as a combination
of social authority and adjudicative fact. Professors Monahan
and Walker label this use “social frameworks,” where some
issue in the particular dispute is claimed to be an instance of a
social scientific finding or theory of general import.28
The Monahan-Walker model, though framed to deal exclu-
sively with social science, nicely captures the three basic divi-
sions of fact-finding that courts must process. Most impor-
tantly, their social framework category is a significant leap for-
ward in clarifying the challenges associated with integrating
empirical research into legal decision-making. Indeed,
arguably the social authority (i.e., legislative facts) and social
facts (i.e., adjudicative facts) are merely components of social
frameworks, with the latter two being defined as a function of
the legal use for evidence, not its scientific nature. In other
words, all empirical research is conceivable in terms of frame-
works, because it invariably has both a general component and
a specific component. Whether the general component is
legally relevant at all and, if so, what it is relevant to prove, dic-
tates in the Monahan-Walker model whether it is a “social
authority” or “social framework.” 
For example, consider the empirical question of the devel-
opmental competence of 16- and 17-year-olds. In the context
of capital punishment, this general fact was used in Roper v.
Simmons29 to support the conclusion that applying the death
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penalty to those who killed before reaching the age of majority
was unconstitutional. As such, this legislative fact was
informed by “social authority.” On the other hand, if the ques-
tion was whether a particular 16- or 17-year-old had compe-
tently waived his Miranda rights, the research used in Roper
would be employed to inform a “social framework.”30 In the
case involving the waiving of Miranda rights, the court would
have to apply the framework to the individual case, thus para-
digmatically using both components of Monahan and Walker’s
social-framework category.
EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORKS
For the purpose of examining evidentiary incommensura-
bility between law and science, the Monahan and Walker con-
cept of social frameworks is all that is specifically needed. It
fully captures the juxtaposition of the inordinate empirical dif-
ficulties surrounding the use of group data to make individual
decisions and the law’s frequent need to do just that. Since the
phenomenon of interest extends well beyond social science,
and includes all applied science with policy implications, the
term “empirical framework” is more accurate and will be used
here. The following sections, therefore, consider the legal
demands on empirical research, from both the more concilia-
tory use of general research data to answer general legal propo-
sitions, to the more demanding use of general data to reach
individualized judgments.
DEFINING THE “FRAME”
Because ordinary science operates at the general level of
descriptive and inferential statistics, it can be readily employed
to determine general propositions. Consider, for example, a
hypothesis that has been the subject of several legal cases: vio-
lent video games cause minors who play them to be violent
and asocial. This hypothesis has been studied in a multitude of
ways, including observational case studies, correlational stud-
ies, laboratory experiments, brain imaging, and so forth.31 If
these differing methods point in the same direction, then some
general conclusions might be made regarding the relationship
between violent video games and violence among children. If
they point in different directions, of course, the task is compli-
cated greatly, if not made impossible, until more research is
done. But even when the body of research is robust, conclu-
sions are likely to be tentative and, at best, described in prob-
abilistic terms.
The legal relevance of the science, however uncertainly
known, depends on the substantive law of the case. In regard
to the violent video game example, then, this hypothesis might
be relevant as a general proposition (e.g., do violent video
games lead to increased violence among children?) or as that
research might apply in a particu-
lar case (e.g., was the minor
defendant’s violent action attrib-
utable to having played violent
video games?).
In the law, most litigation
tends to involve the application
of general principles to a specific
case. Frequently, however, a gen-
eral proposition of science is
itself at issue. A good example of
this, coming from the violence-
in-media example, is the case
Entertainment Software Association v. Blagojevich.32 In Enter-
tainment Software, several video-game-industry trade associa-
tions sued the State to enjoin the enforcement of two statutes
that regulated the content of violent and sexually explicit
video games. The plaintiffs argued that the State’s laws vio-
lated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. The
district court agreed that the laws implicated First Amend-
ment rights and held that the legislation could survive only if
the State had a compelling interest that would be substantially
achieved by the laws. The court found that “[t]he Illinois
General Assembly’s main justifications were three legislative
findings about the effect of playing video games on minors’
physiological and neurological development.”33 According to
the court, the legislature believed that playing violent video
games makes children (1) “exhibit violent, asocial, or aggres-
sive behavior”; (2) “[e]xperience feelings of aggression”; and
(3) “[e]xperience a reduction of activity in the frontal lobes of
the brain which is responsible for controlling behavior.”34 In
concluding that Illinois had not met its considerable burden,
the court extensively reviewed psychological and neurological
research that had been advanced by the State. The court
explained that the State “failed to present substantial evidence
showing that playing violent video games causes minors to
have aggressive feelings or engage in aggressive behavior.”35
Moreover, the court stated that “there is barely any evidence
at all, let alone substantial evidence, showing that playing vio-
lent video games causes minors to ‘experience a reduction of
activity in the frontal lobes of the brain which is responsible
for controlling behavior.”’36 The court permanently enjoined
the Illinois law.
The second hypothesis, that a particular minor’s violent
action is attributable to having played violent video games, is
the more typical courtroom situation in regard to scientific evi-
dence. In these cases, both the general hypothesis and the spe-
cific hypothesis are at issue. Although the defense is unusual,
defendants have on occasion argued insanity on the basis of
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video programming.37 In Zamora
v. State,38 for example, “Zamora’s
insanity defense was based upon
‘involuntary subliminal television
intoxication.”’ In particular,
defense counsel argued that vio-
lent television had a noxious
influence on sociopathic children
and that Zamora had killed as a
consequence of this effect.39 To
support this theory, the defense
offered two experts. The first, a
psychologist, offered to testify to
the effect of television on adoles-
cents generally.40 A second expert, a psychiatrist, testified that
the defendant “did not know right from wrong” when he “fired
the fatal shot,” thus applying the general theory of the case to
the particular defendant. The court excluded the psychologist
on the ground that she could not speak to Zamora’s individual
case. The psychiatrist testified at trial, but apparently to little
effect, since Zamora was convicted.
In the courtroom, research on general propositions, such as
whether violent media causes an increase in violence among
children, addresses a threshold question and one which scien-
tists are trained to address. In an insanity defense to murder,
however, the question is whether the particular person’s vio-
lence was caused by exposure to violent media. This issue of
specific application poses a complex and difficult cognitive
exercise. Moreover, it is an exercise that varies in different
empirical contexts. It is also a subject that has been substan-
tially ignored by scientists interested in the courtroom use of
their data.
REASONING TO THE SPECIFIC
Although the challenge of reasoning from general research
data to individual cases has been considered in a fairly cursory
manner by courts and legal scholars, the basic challenges are
fairly easily summarized. This is especially so in the conven-
tional toxic-tort-litigation context, the area in which courts
have most often considered it. In a nutshell, the first task is to
demonstrate that the substance could have caused the ailment
(i.e., the validity of the general proposition); the second task is
to show both that it probably did, and that other substances
probably did not, cause the plaintiff’s condition.
The simplest case of this reasoning process might involve
general research that indicates that some substance causes an
ailment that is uniquely associated with that substance. For
instance, as noted in Part I, asbestos has been shown to cause
mesothelioma, and it is the only substance known to cause it.41
Since mesothelioma is a “signature disease,” the only question
concerns the circumstances of the individual’s exposure to
asbestos (i.e., was the defendant responsible?), not whether
exposure caused the condition. The cause-and-effect path-
specificity operates in this example to permit straightforward
logical deductions from the general data to individual cases.
This is rare in toxic tort litigation. For example, in contrast to
asbestos, while second-hand smoke has been linked to lung
cancer, many other substances are known to cause lung cancer.
Hence, in regard to identifying the cause of a person’s lung can-
cer, an expert must not only rule in smoking as a possible
cause but also rule out other possible causes.42
The principal tool used to move from general research find-
ings to statements about individual cases is “differential etiol-
ogy,” sometimes misleadingly referred to as “differential diag-
nosis.” Properly understood, differential diagnosis refers to the
identification of the illness or behavioral condition that a per-
son is experiencing. Differential etiology refers to the cause or
causes of that condition. Hence, the determination that a per-
son suffers from “dissociative amnesia” and not “dissociative
fugue” is a diagnostic issue.43 The determination that a sexual
assault at age ten caused the diagnosed dissociative amnesia,
and that it did not result from a medical condition or physical
trauma, is an etiological matter. Very different skill sets are
usually involved in these two determinations. Indeed, the
American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (the DSM) explicitly eschews any
claim of the etiological verity of its diagnostic categories.44 It is
worth emphasizing, as well, that the validity of the diagnosis of
dissociative amnesia is a matter of general research. The entire
process of differential diagnosis and differential etiology
assumes that the designated category has adequate empirical
support in the first place as a general proposition. Hence,
although it is logically obvious, it should be stated plainly that
an expert should never be permitted to testify about a specific
application of a general proposition if research does not ade-
quately support the general proposition.
In the professional practice of both clinical medicine and
clinical psychology, the primary concern is diagnosis and not
etiology. An oncologist might be curious about what caused his
or her patient’s leukemia, but the doctor’s first task is to diag-
nose and treat the condition, not determine whether it was
caused by trichloroethylene, benzene, electromagnetic fields,
or something else. Similarly, a psychologist treating a person
thought to suffer from either PTSD or adjustment disorder is
primarily concerned with identifying and treating the condi-
tion, not determining the true causes of that condition. In the
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ordinary practice of clinical medicine and clinical psychology,
treatment and therapy are the principal objectives, not assess-
ing cause. A person presenting symptoms associated with
PTSD, therefore, may claim that the traumatic event was a sex-
ual assault committed by her uncle. From the therapeutic
standpoint, at least at the start, the important factor is that
there was a traumatic event. Whether the patient’s uncle was
the cause need not be specifically resolved for diagnostic pur-
poses. In the law, of course, who caused the traumatic event is
the crux of the matter. Hence, the core nature of much clinical
practice is at right angles to the crux of most legal inquiries.
In the courtroom, differential etiology is the operative issue.
Moreover, the same basic principle is implicated, whether the
expert opinion comes from research-based science or clinical
practice (i.e., “experience”). Indeed, at least superficially, the
former suffers a comparative disadvantage, since the research
tradition does not ordinarily purport to offer conclusive state-
ments about individual cases. Research, for example, might
identify factors highly associated with false confessions, but
these general propositions are some distance from what is
needed to allow experts to opine regarding the truth or falsity
of any particular confession. Clinicians at least have a history
of applying general knowledge to individual cases, though, as
noted, while this practice might be well accepted for therapeu-
tic purposes, its validity for forensic ends is somewhat doubt-
ful. Whether researchers or clinicians have the wherewithal to
help triers of fact in applying general research propositions to
specific cases is a threshold legal matter that should depend on
the reliability and validity of the differential etiology done in
the respective case. It may be, that is, that in vast areas of clin-
ical practice there is no general research foundation in the first
instance. And, as stated above, if research does not support a
general proposition—say, the phenomenon of repressed mem-
ories—then clinical expert testimony that a particular person
has repressed certain memories of early sexual abuse cannot be
sustained.
DIFFERENTIAL ETIOLOGY
Differential etiology is a reasoning process that involves a
multitude of factors, few of which are easily quantified. An
expert offering an opinion regarding a specific case must first
consider the strength of the evidence for the general proposi-
tion being applied in the case. If the claim is that substance X
caused plaintiff’s condition Y, the initial inquiry must concern
the strength of the relationship between X and Y as a general
proposition. For example, both second-hand smoke and first-
hand smoke are associated with lung cancer, but the strength
of the relationship generally is much stronger for the latter
than it is for the former. The inquiry regarding strength of rela-
tionship will depend on many factors, including, among other
things, the statistical strength of any claims and the quality of
the methods used in the research.
Additionally, the general model
must consider the strength of the
evidence for alternative possible
causes of Y and the strength of
their respective relationships (and
possibly interactions with other
factors). Again, the quality of the
research and the different method-
ologies employed will make com-
parisons difficult. Complicating
matters further regarding identification of potential causes of
condition Y are the myriad of possible causes that have not
been studied, or have been studied inadequately.45 Hence,
determining the contours of the general model is a dicey affair
in itself, since it requires combining disparate research results
and discounting those results by an unknown factor associated
with additional variables not yet studied. And this is just the
first part of the necessary analysis if the expert wants to give an
opinion about an individual case.
The second part of the analysis—specific application of gen-
eral propositions that are themselves supported by adequate
research—requires two abilities, neither of which are clearly
within most scientists’ skill sets. The first, and perhaps less
problematic, is that of forensic investigator. Almost no matter
what the empirical relationship, whether medical or psycho-
logical, exposure or dosage levels will be relevant to the diag-
nosis. The first principle of toxicology is that “the dose makes
the poison,” since any substance in sufficient quantities could
injure or kill someone.46 Similarly, in a wide variety of psycho-
logical contexts, the exposure or dose will be the poison. For
instance, degree of trauma affects diagnostic categorization
between PTSD and adjustment disorder, level of anxiety affects
eyewitness identifications, amount of lack of sleep affects false
confession rates, and so on. The expert testifying to specific
causation must determine exposure and dosage levels for the
suspected cause (i.e., the source suspected by the client) as
well as for all other known or possible causes. This task is dif-
ficult enough alone but is enormously complicated by the sig-
nificant potential for recall bias, given that the litigation will be
profoundly affected by what is recalled.
The second skill set that is needed has not yet been invented
or even described with precision. Somehow, the diagnostician
must combine the surfeit of information concerning the multi-
tude of factors that make up the general model, with the case
history information known or suspected about the individual,
and offer an opinion with some level of confidence that sub-
stance or experience X was the likely cause of condition Y. In
practice, this opinion is usually stated as follows: “Within a
reasonable degree of medical/psychological certainty, it is my
opinion that X caused [a particular case of] Y.” This expression
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has no empirical meaning and is simply a mantra repeated by
experts for purposes of legal decision makers who similarly
have no idea what it means. But even less extreme versions of
this statement—such as, “It is more likely than not true that
this case is an instance of some general phenomenon”—are
objectionable. Just how, for instance, would an eyewitness
researcher determine that a witness was more likely than not
inaccurate when the witness made a cross-racial identification
of the defendant after seeing the unarmed perpetrator for five
minutes under a streetlight from an unobstructed view 20 feet
away from the crime? There is no data that would support psy-
chologists’ ability to make such statements, however modest or
innocuous such statements may appear. Experts’ case-specific
conclusions appear to be based largely on an admixture of an
unknown combination of knowledge of the subject, experi-
ence over the years, commitment to the client or cause, intu-
ition, and blind faith. Science it is not.
Whether, and in what way, particular scientific findings are
relevant to legal decision-making depends on the substantive
law of the case. Frequently, the relevant factual issue under
applicable law involves general propositions, ones that popu-
lation-based research corresponds to directly. Much more
often, however, the empirical focus of the ultimate legal issue
is on the particular case. But conventional scientific methods
do not share this focus. Although research data might demon-
strate with high confidence that a particular variable has an
effect of interest, it typically cannot demonstrate with the same
confidence that the particular variable had the effect of interest
in a particular case. Reconciling this evidentiary incommensu-
rability between what science ordinarily does and what the law
ordinarily needs is, as yet, one of the great unmet challenges at
the intersection of science and the law.
CONCLUSION
Most evidentiary codes require that expert testimony “assist
the trier of fact” in order for it to be admissible.47 Scientific
expert testimony, however, must be legally relevant and have
evidentiary reliability (i.e., scientific validity).48 Moreover,
expert opinion must offer insights beyond what triers of fact
could do on their own. Put another way, scientist-experts are
limited to testifying about what their respective field’s research
can validly add to fact-finders’ deliberations—and nothing
more. This injunction, however, is not always followed. In par-
ticular, experts frequently seek to comment not simply on the
import of general research findings, but on whether a particu-
lar case fits those findings. Scientific research that permits a
valid description of a general phenomenon, however, does not
invariably give experts the capacity to validly determine
whether an individual case is an instance of that general phe-
nomenon.
A basic difference in perspective between science and the
law is that science studies individuals in order to make state-
ments about populations, while the law studies populations in
order to make statements about individuals. It does not neces-
sarily follow that a scientist who can validly describe a general
phenomenon also has the wherewithal to say whether an indi-
vidual case is an instance of that general phenomenon. In
many respects, the matter of translating scientific research
findings into helpful information for fact-finders in court
should be a subject of first concern for applied science. Yet this
issue has been largely ignored by scientists. This essay calls for
a broadly conceived collaborative effort to consider this basic
issue, one that is endemic to the intersection of law and sci-
ence.
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